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RECENT CASES
the court in construing said statute. 5 There is, at least, one decision which
has decided this question and reached a result contrary to the Colorado posi-
tion.' 6
What, then, could have been the basis for the decision in the principal
case? The court states that in the statute17 adopted in 1913, now remaining
and unchanged for forty-seven years, none of the statesi s promulgated by the
Public Service Commission appear. 19
It is submitted that in determining the utility or non-utility status of a
given industry, the facts in each particular case must be the determining
factor. However, the courts should give liberal interpretation to statutes
which permit government regulation of business if public policy is to follow
the trends it has established over the years in developing our economic
system.
KERMIT EDVARD BYE.
I{OMOCIDE - CORPUS DELICTI - BODY MISSING. - Defendant was convicted
of the murder of his wife who simply disappeared from her home, dropped
out of sight and has not been heard from since. The prosecution contended
that the evidence proved defendant's motive for doing away with his wife.
He had coveted her estate, attempted to prepare her friends for an explanation
of her departure, and was pleased at her subsequent disappearance. More-
over, he deceived her friends and the authorities in order to prevent an in-
vestigation and set about through forgeries and thefts to steal her property.
Defendant then fled the country only to be apprehended at the Canadian
border. The state contends his flight was precipated by his fear of prosecution
for the murder of his wife. The prosecution offered no evidence of the use
of criminal means to accomplish death, produced no body and proved no
confession. Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish the corpus delicti. On appeal the California District Court of Appeal,
held, in homocide prosecutions, all that is required to prove death is circum-
stantial evidence sufficient to convince minds of reasonable men of existence
of fact. People v. Scott, 1 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1960).
The trial court based it's decision on two recent cases, Regina v. Onu-
freiczyk' an English decision, and The King v. Horry2 a New Zeland de-
15. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 351 P.2d 241 (1960).
16. Industrial Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 135 Ohio St. 408, 21 N.E.2d
166 (1939) (Company had 50 miles of pipeline and -supplied 19 industrial users, held: a
public utility).
17. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 115-1-3 (1953).
18. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 351 P.2d 241 (1960).
The Public Utilities Commission promulgated its own tests for determining public utility
status: and are based on the nature of the service rendered to include, (1) whether a
natural or virtual monopoly, (2) the exorbitance or r-asonableness of the charges, (3) the
arbitrary control to which its customers may be subject' d, (4) whether or not the impact
of its service, or the lack thereof, to a class of customers affects the state or community,
(5) and whether the services rendered are needful and cannot be surrendered without
obvious general loss and inconvenience.
19. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 351 P.2d 241 (1960)
"We find no precedent for the rule as announced by the commission. It contains no
standard whereby it could be applied with any degree of uniformity; it furnishes no guide
whereby the supplier or the customer could determine the utility or non-utility status of the
supplier."
1. [19551 1 Q.B. 388.
2. [1952] N.Z.L.R. 111.
1961]
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cision, which affirmed convictions of first degree murder solely 3 on circum-
stantial evidence. Here the courts held, "There may be other (as opposed to
direct) facts so incriminating and so incapable of, any reasonable explanation
as to be incompatible with any hypothesis other than murder."
Lord Hale, the noted English jurist, developed the theory that the fact of
death must be proved by direct evidence. 4 Contemporary authorities gen-
erally recognize certain exceptions to this rule, and these are: (1) cases of
bodies missing at sea,5 (2) infanticide prosecutions 6 and (3) eyewitness testi-
mony that the body has been destroyed, rendering it impossible that it should
ever be produced.7
Apparently, there are no reported cases exactly in point from any state or
federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the English cases cited above provide the only
real basis for an authoritative conclusion. Courts8 and writers9 alike are
uniformly agreed that the fact of death may be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence. However, cases supporting this contention are invariably qualified by
the presence of proof of death consisting of (1) direct evidence of homo-
cidel t (2) identifiable remains 1 or (3) incriminating evidence coupled with
confessions or admissions.12 None seem to be so devoid of positive proof as
the case at hand.
It seems unreasonable to assume that a person who successfully eliminates
all traces of his victim should escape. On the other hand Lord Hale's rule
should not be dismissed lightly.13 History records instances of convictions
on scanty evidence, followed by immediate execution, only to have the alleged
victim appear later very much alive.
1 4
3. In the Onufreiczyk case the court chose not to consider a bloodstain as direct evi-
dence. A letter written by defendant in the Horry case, indicating knowledge of death
was not considered.
4. "I would never convict any person of murder or manslaughter, unless the fact were
proved to be done, or at least the body found dead . . . for the sake of two cases [where
persons were executed for murders of others then alive but missing] .. ." 2 Hales, Pleas of
the Crown 290 (1847). See also, 4 Blackstone Commentaries 358 (Lewis's ed. 1897).
5. St. Clair v. U.S., 154 U.S. 134 (1894); see U.S. v. Matthews, 26 Fed Cas. 1204,
1207 (No. 15,741b) (C.C. N.Y. 1843); U.S. v. Gilb-it, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1290 (No.
15,204) (C.C. Mass. 1834).
6. Generally it is necessary to prove existence of life before proving fact of death in
infanticide prosecutions. Shedd v. State, 178 Ga. 653, 173 S.E. 847 (1934); People v.
Kirby, 223 Mich. 440, 194 N.W. 142 (1923); State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 161 N.W.
1022 (1917); State v. Merrill, 72 W.Va. 500, 78 S.E. 699 (1913).
7. People v. Watters, 202 Cal. 154, 259 Pac. 442 (1927); Ruloff v. People, 18 N.Y.
17K9, (1858) (dictum).
8. E. g., People v. Clark, 70 Cal. App. 531, 233 Pac. 980 (1922); see e. g., Inman
v. State, 23 Ala. 484, 127 So. 262 (1930); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31
A.2d 155, 158 (1943). Contra, State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 161 N.W. 1022 (1917).
9. See, e.g., 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence 37 (5th ed. 1956); 3 Warren, Homocide
270 (1938).
10. People v. Wilkins, 158 Cal. 530, 111 Pac. 612 (1910); Commonwealth v. Gates,
392 Pa. 557, 141 A.2d 219 (1958).
11. This category includes identifiable personal effects found on or near the remains.
Lewis v. State, 220 Ala. 461, 125 So. 802 (1933); People v. Hamilton, 49 Cal. App. 30,
192 Pac. 467 (1920); State v. King, 111 Kan. 140, 206 Pae. 883 (1922).
12. Lewis v. State, rupra note 11; People v. Clark, supra note 8; Sullivan v. State, 58
Neb. 716, 79 N.W. 721 (1899).
13. Morris, Corpus Delicti and Cricumstantial Evidence, 68 L.Q. Rev. 391 (1952) "It
is trite law that Lord Hale's statement in 2 Pleas of the Crown, 290-'1 would never
convict any person of murder or manslaughter, unless the fact were proved to be done,
or at least the body found dead'--can no longer be read as requiring production of the
corpse, or a vital part thereof, as a condition precedent to a conviction."
14. Starkie, Evidence 862 (4th ed.) "the accused shall not be convicted unless
the death be first distinctly proved, either by direct evidence of the fact, or by inspection
of the body; a rule warranted by melancholy experience of the conviction and execution
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Five states, Colorado, Montana, New York, North Dakota and Texas,1 5
aware of the inherent danger of incriminating circumstantial evidence, re-
quire some type of direct evidence. This statutory requirement eliminates any
question as to the quantum or type of evidence necessary in North Dakota.
This seems to be the logical approach, especially in those jurisdictions demand-
ing the death penalty. Further appeal may result in the reversal of the de-
cision here, but if not, legislation of the type found in North Dakota may
necessarily result.
R. STEFANSON.
NAMES - CHANGE - RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AND SUFFICIENCY OF REASON. -
Petitioner sought to change his surname from Rusconi to Bryan. A reason for
the petition was the wife's distaste of the Italian heritage. The lower court
upheld the objection of petitioner's relatives, that the petition was an "un-
American" affront to persons of Italian origin. The Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts in reversing held that the right to change one's name is very broad;
that objections of "uin-Americanism" and the alleged affront to Italian people,
did not constitute legal cause for denial of the petition. In re Rusconi's Pe-
tition, 167 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1960).
At common law mere adoption and use of a name constituted a permissible
change without resorting to legal proceedings, if such change was not for a
dishonest purpose.1 State statutes were not meant to abrogate this common law
right,2 but rather to aid and facilitate recording such change.3 The problem
of statutory name change lies in the fact that the change is generally not a
question of right but one of judicial discretion. 4 Several states have enacted
statutes in this respect, which are in general agreement as to the require-
ments for name change. 5  In North Dakota an application to change a name
of supposed offenders, charged with the murder of persons who survived their alleged
murderers."
15. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 (1953) "...nor shall any person suffer the death
penalty who shall have been convicted on circumstantial evidence alone."; Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 94-2510 (1947) "No person can be convicted of murder or manslaughter
unless the death of the person, alleged to have been killed, and the fact of the killing
by the defendant as alleged, are established as independent acts; the former by direct proof,
and the latter beyond a reasonable doubt."; N.Y. Pen. Law § 1041 (1944) "What proof
of death required- No person can be convicted of murder or manslaughter unless the
death of the person alleged to have been killed and the fact of killing by the defendant,
as alleged, are each established as independent facts; the former by direct proof, and the
latter beyond a reasonable doubt."; N.D. Rev. Code § 12-2788 (1943) "Independent
Facts Necessary to Prove Guilt. No person can be convicted of murder, manslaughter nor
of aiding suicide, unless the death of the person alleged to have been killed and the fact
of the killing by the accused as alleged, are established as independent facts, the former
by direct evidence and the latter beyond a reasonable doubt."; Tex. Pen. Code art. 1204
(1925) "No person shall be convicted of any grade ef homocide unless the body of the
deceased, or portions of it, are found and sufficiently identified to establish the fact of the
death of the person charged to have been killed."
1. See, e.g., Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910);
Petition of Merolevitz, 320 Mass. 448, 70 N.E.2d 249, 250 (1946).
2. Reinken v. Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 184 N.E. 639 (1933); Huff v. State Election Bd.,
168 Okla. 277, 32 P.2d 920 (1934).
3. See In re Ross, $ Cal.2d 608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852,
255 N.Y. Supp. 616, 617 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
4. Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A.2d 203 (1955); Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga. App.
280, 63 S.E.2d 345 (1951); In re Taminosian, 97 Neb. 514, 150 N.W. 824 (1915).
5. Examples of such enactments are: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. tit. 8, § 1275, 77, 78
(1955); Ga. Code Ann. c. 79-5 (1937); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 96 (1958); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
61 (1958); N.D. Rev. Code § 32-2802 (1943).
